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CHAPTER 2 
Falling over the Competitive Edge 
n the Celtic Tiger years of the 1990s, Ireland apparently 
rode the roller coaster of freewheeling capitalism 
towards the information society. A boom in high 
technology industry was said to be fbelled by a new 
entrepreneurial class competing in free markets, and driven 
forward by private investors motivated by low tax rates. 
Ireland was unusual too in that it turned to international 
investors as the source of economic change. Foreign invest- 
ment in high technology was intensely promoted, stressing 
Ireland's attractions: a skilled English-speaking labour 
force, access to the EU market and, above all, low corporate 
tax rates. The untrammelled market remained the road to a 
coveted place in the brave new information economy. 
This belief would have been all too familiar to Karl 
Polanyi, who wrote in the 1940s of the dangers of the 'liberal 
creed' that elevates markets above all other social 
relationships. l While markets can be important and useful 
institutions, creating a 'market society' that prioritises 
markets over relationships of community and social 
solidarity will ultimately lead to social fragmentation and 
even economic decline. Sustainable economic growth must 
remain embedded in social relationships - as markets 
1 K. Polanyi, The Great Dansformation, Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 
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themselves tend to undermine the relationships of co- 
operation that are essential to social life and economic 
development. After World War 11, many advanced capitalist 
countries, in Polanyian fashion, embedded market 
relationships firmly within national welfare state 
institutions and international controls on trade and capital 
flows. Since the 1970s, however, these social and political 
institutions have been under attack from a new, virulent 
form of the 'liberal creed', which advocates widespread 
deregulation, privatisation and reduced public spending. 
A blind faith in the global market had come early to 
Ireland, with the turn to foreign investment and free trade 
in the 1950s. After the economic disasters of the 1980s, 
globalisation appeared kinder to Ireland in the 1990s with 
the Celtic Tiger boom. In 2002, however, the economy 
slowed, inflation rose, foreign investment rates declined and 
unemployment began to increase. Nonetheless, faith in the 
market society persisted. The widespread solution offered to 
these dilemmas was the restoration of cost competitiveness 
by reining in public spending and controlling wages. The 
barriers posed to market action by the public sector, social 
welfare and the demands of community and solidarity were 
to be stripped away. 
On the road to the post-industrial economy 
Both the diagnosis and the cure for the Irish economy stated 
above are mistaken. Clearly, a boom in foreign investment 
did drive the rapid expansion in growth and exports in the 
late 1990s. But many of the best-known foreign firms were 
simply moving goods through their Irish operations to take 
advantage of low tax rates, creating an entrep6t economy 
that provided an illusion of growth and development. 
Significant elements of the Celtic Tiger were a mirage.2 
P. Honohan, B. Maitre and C. Conroy, 'Invisible EntrepBt Activity in 
Irish Manufacturing', Irish Banking Review, Summer 1998, pp. 22- 
36. 
Nonetheles 
economy, an 
transformatic 
economy. Spe: 
new forms of 1 
became incrl 
improved. Iri 
important int 
investors in tl 
in the labour 
female laboc 
declined and I 
these transfoi 
institutions a1 
and society ral 
supported by 
technology. If 
surprisingly c, 
new social ax 
creation emerg 
Although thi 
are in high tec: 
that all manu 
18.6 per cent o: 
per cent of tht 
2001. The en 
impressive fea. 
2002, was only 
in manufacturi 
services emplc 
business, retail 
The Irish lab 
shift since the : 
industrial' worl 
employment co 
S. 0 Riain, The. 
University Pres: 
FALLING OVER THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 
/ 
of co- 
conomic 
xpitalist 
market 
state 
1 capital 
political 
virulent 
lespread 
iding. 
early to 
ree trade 
.e 1980% 
190s with 
economy 
lined and 
lth in the 
offered to 
titiveness 
ages. The 
tor, social 
irity were 
,my stated 
nvestment 
orts in the 
hrms were 
)ns to take 
~t economy 
velopment. 
irage. 2 
,Bt Activity in 
1998, pp. 22- 
Nonetheless, alongside this conjuring trick of the global 
economy, and often in the same firms, significant 
transformations occurred in the capabilities of the Irish 
economy. Spending on research and development increased, 
new forms of team production were adopted, the labour force 
became increasingly professionalised and productivity 
improved. Irish-owned firms grew and a number became 
important international companies: exporters and overseas 
investors in their own right.3 Most significant were changes 
in the labour market: as employment rose dramatically, 
female labour participation increased, unemployment 
declined and mass emigration was reversed. As it turns out, 
these transformations were rooted in new sets of social 
institutions and alliances between groups within the state 
and society rather than in individual entrepreneurial action 
supported by freewheeling markets for money, labour and 
technology. If the Celtic Tiger was a mirage, it was also a 
surprisingly concrete set of changes in economic life and 
new social and organisational capacities for knowledge 
creation emerged. 
Although the most high profile parts of the Irish economy 
are in high tech manufacturing, it is important to recognise 
that all manufacturing only accounted for approximately 
18.6 per cent of total Irish employment in 2001 and for 14.5 
per cent of the growth in employment between 1987 and 
2001. The employment growth, which was the most 
impressive feature of the Irish economy in the decade to 
2002, was only partly based, therefore, on transformations 
in manufacturing. It was also rooted in expanding social 
services employment and expanding local demand for 
business, retail, construction and personal services. 
The Irish labour force has clearly undergone a structural 
shift since the 1970s, with a marked trend towards a 'post- 
industrial' workforce. In the 1990s, even as agricultural 
employment continued its steady decline, manufacturing 
S. 0 Riain, The Politics ofHigh Tech Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
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grew at 3.6 per cent annually, while social services grew at 
4.4 per cent and market services grew at 5.7 per cent.4 The 
transformation looks more dramatic when we focus on key 
sectors such as insurance, finance and business services 
(incorporating financial services and software) and health 
and education: the only sectors to record steady employment 
growth in every decade since the 1970s. Taken together with 
the unprecedented employment creation of the 1990s, 
Ireland has undergone a rapid shift towards a post-Fordist 
economy and a post-industrial workforce - driven in large 
part by high tech manufacturing, producer services and 
social services. 
Typically, this transformation is seen as being driven 
solely by foreign investment. But this ignores the growing 
sophistication of foreign firms in Ireland, and the ability of 
the local economy to absorb new forms of work and 
technology. Furthermore, a set of indigenous industries has 
emerged that is only partly driven by links to foreign 
investment in Ireland - most significantly, the software 
sector. In these industries, the role of local entrepreneurs 
was clearly important and this entrepreneurship was deeply 
embedded in the set of surrounding institutions that shaped 
and moulded it. Firms that received state grant aid did not 
seek the easy road of surviving on grants, but grew faster, 
exported earlier and were more likely to be involved in 
innovative activities and alliances. Private investment was 
remarkably unadventurous in supporting Irish high tech 
firms in the 1990s; the state was the risk-taking investor in 
these crucial early years, and private investment capital 
only flowed into indigenous high technology when the 
returns were relatively certain. 
Furthermore, since the 1980s, a network of semi-public 
institutions had emerged (funded and sponsored by the Irish 
state and the EU and often linked to the universities) that 
supported innovation and research. Innovation centres, 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC), An Investment in 
Quality: Services, Inclusion and Enterprise, Dublin: NESC, 2002. 
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programmes in advanced technology, technology centres and 
grew a t  other institutions were an important collective set of 
nt.4 The i 
I supports for individual technologists and business people. 
s on key c Indigenous firms emerged where these institutions existed 
services i to enable local actors to take advantage of the connections to 
foreign investment and foreign markets. Indeed, it seems 
highly likely that the foreign investment boom of the late 
1990s was itself encouraged by the growing sophistication of 
the innovative capacities of the Irish economy. 
t-Fordist r If export competitiveness has driven Ireland part of the 
way down the road to the informational economy, it has gone 
hand-in-hand with public sector expansion of social services 
employment. Together, these twin drivers of economic 
development have generated huge local demand (since 
around 1994) resulting in rapid increases in employment in 
sectors such as personal services and construction. In any 
overall explanation of the dramatic expansion of employ- 
;tries has 
ment in Ireland, we need to focus not only on foreign 
investment or even general export competitiveness, 
software important though these have been, but on the interaction of 
those sectors with the rather more unfashionable public 
sector, where job expansion was instrumental in creating 
patterns of local demand that generated further employ- 
ment increases. Ultimately, the significant transformations 
in the Celtic Tiger are not driven so much by freewheeling 
market capitalism, as by a set of politically constructed and 
ment was institutionally supported state-society alliances, extending 
across institutions of innovation and social partnership. In 
many cases, these institutions have emerged despite the 
official ideology of the efficiency of market mechanisms and 
the moral superiority of individual entrepreneurship. 
The competitiveness obsession and the threat to the 
n centres, As growth and exports slowed dramatically in 2002 and 
unemployment began to rise, the airwaves were filled with 
zvestment in calls to restore competitiveness in the Irish economy. 
SC, 2002. 
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Indeed, competitiveness has been institutionalised as a 
national policy priority with the establishing of the National 
Competitiveness Council, which monitors almost any aspect 
of social and economic life for its implications for firm 
competitiveness. The focus of the competitiveness agenda 
has been the reduction of costs, and the policy mechanisms 
of choice to achieve this goal are wage restraint and reduced 
public spending. 
Casting the problems of the Irish economy in terms of 
competitiveness inevitably leads to calls for a crackdown on 
excessive public spending and wages. But the Celtic Tiger 
years have made competing on costs an increasingly 
precarious proposition for Irish firms, as reflected in recent 
job losses in the traditional sectors of the economy. The 
agenda for the Irish economy must be one of upgrading, 
learning and innovation. The current economic difficulties 
in Ireland fundamentally reflect the dilemmas of managing 
a transition from a low wage to a high wage economy, and 
industrial upgrading has become not just a motor of 
development, however incomplete, but a necessity. 
Wage competitiveness is, in any case, of uneven 
importance in the Irish economy. The most dynamic high 
tech sectors either rely more heavily on tax breaks than low i 
wages or have seen rapidly rising wages, outside the scope 
of the national social partnership agreements. On the other i 
hand, wages have remained all too low in many services 
sectors and it is perverse to call for further restraint. Where 
1 
wage restraint has been most important is in the least 
sophisticated sectors of Irish industry and in managing the 
i 
t 
i 
public sector pay bill to assist in reducing public debt. Calls 
for wage restraint do not address the complexities of the 
i 
variety of upgrading strategies required in different sectors 
and the politics of balancing these sectoral differences 
within the national political economy. 
Indeed, focusing on wage restraint directs policy attention 
away from investing in labour, learning and improved 
training, and long-term career development and security. A 
neo-liberal economic strategy, focused on a narrow concept 
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of cost competitiveness, will seriously undermine this 
necessary upgrading: potentially generating a vicious circle 
of declining investment, rising inequality and ultimately the 
weakening of co-ordination capacities and the social basis of 
the knowledge economy. Nonetheless, this is the strategy 
that the Fianna FAil and Progressive Democrats coalition 
government has pursued: cutting back on public spending 
(already at  a remarkably low level compared to other 
countries) and in the process undermining the very 
institutions that had important developmental impacts in 
the Celtic Tiger years. 
Similar problems arise in relation to cutbacks in public 
spending and low levels of long-term public investment; 
such policies are damaging Ireland's capacity to evolve as an 
information society. The education system is suffering as the 
decline in the numbers of young people in the population is 
seen as an opportunity for cost cutting in education rather 
than a chance to implement smaller class sizes and other 
forms of pedagogical best practice. Reduction in funding for 
research has threatened long-term organisational 
development in the universities, just as a new set of 
research institutions was being established. More broadly, 
students in primary and secondary schools have walked out 
of their classes to protest at  the deteriorating physical 
condition of their school buildings. There is a perversity in a 
system that lauds the knowledge economy and society, while 
failing to support the very educational institutions - from 
primary to third level - that are crucial to building them. 
Commercialisation and cutbacks have also undermined 
the network of innovation institutions that were important 
to the upgrading that took place in the 1990s. The Centre for 
Software Engineering (CSE) at  Dublin City University has 
played an important and widely acknowledged role in 
promoting quality in software engineering. However, 
reduced public funding in recent years and cutbacks in 
funding to Dublin City University have left the CSE in deep 
financial trouble and facing closure or management buy-out. 
Despite wide university and industry recognition of the 
25 
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important role played by the CSE in developing the software 
industry, a critical part of the institutional infrastructure of 
this industry is being undermined by the priority put on cost 
containment over collective investment. 
Ultimately, competitiveness measures have threatened 
industrial upgrading and innovation by weakening the 
social foundations of labour and learning. Costs have to be 
managed, but there is little evidence so far that market 
liberalisation has been successful in that area. 
Furthermore, just when sustained public investment in the 
long-term development of collective capabilities is more 
necessary than ever, it is undermined by reduced public 
spending and the blind implementation of market 
liberalisation. 
The Celtic Tiger was a missed opportunity. The creation of 
innovative capacities in the Irish economy could have gone 
much further, but was limited by weak investment in social 
institutions of learning. Those institutions that did promote 
innovation in the Irish economy emerged in the gaps and 
spaces left by those institutions purely focused on attracting 
foreign investment. Rising inequality could have been 
tackled more decisively through a redistributive approach to 
tax and welfare and, more significantly, by building a more 
inclusive set of institutions to support learning and 
innovation. The economic growth of the 1990s offered the 
opportunity for creative social democratic politics, with the 
possibility of narrowing the gap between the working and 
middle classes while still rewarding the middle classes. 
However, the opposite occurred: while most groups in 
society saw significant improvements in their situation 
through the Celtic Tiger years, policies consistently 
favoured the middle classes over the working classes and 
contributed to increased inequality. 
The institutions that were built in the 1990s to support 
innovation and promote social solidarity were always 
threatened by the official story of the Celtic Tiger as a 
market-driven economy - the Irish version of Polanyi's 
'liberal creed'. During the boom years, these tensions were 
papered over by 
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papered over by rapid growth and booming tax revenues. 
But, when tougher times hit, the choice between free 
markets, and innovation and equality was posed more 
starkly: will the information society in Ireland be unequal 
and based on low wage competition, or will a more 
egalitarian, deeper system of innovation be created? The 
contemporary obsession with competitiveness threatens the 
very institutions that made possible the most significant 
changes in the Celtic Tiger years. Nonetheless, the 
opportunities to tackle inequality and build a structure of 
indigenous innovation remain - if the process of building 
social and political institutions can be sustained in the face 
of the narrow competitiveness agenda. 
Ireland and Finland on the road to the information society 
Is it simply wishful thinking to believe that we can have an 
economy that combines export competitiveness with 
equality and that can sustain investment in a sophisticated 
innovation system and a developed, universalist welfare 
state? No, it is not. Finland provides an example ofjust such 
a state. Finland, which experienced a similar boom to 
Ireland in the late 1990s, has in many respects a more 
sophisticated information economy and is clearly more 
egalitarian than Ireland. 
The generous and universalist Finnish welfare state helps 
maintain the skilled and healthy population that sustains 
the information economy, while the information economy 
helps pay for the welfare state. Sustained by significant and 
long-term public investment policies to support innovation 
and vibrant communities of technology developers, Finland 
has combined growth and equality, and is one of the most 
competitive economies in the world.5 The Scandinavian 
economies also attract large amounts of foreign investment 
despite high tax rates and a strong welfare state - indeed 
M. Castells and P. Himanen, The Information Society and the Welfare 
State: The Finnish Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
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the investment they attract is much more sophisticated 
than that lured to Ireland by the promise of low taxes and 
transfer pricing alongside a skilled labour force. 
Ultimately, the lessons of the Irish and Finnish cases are 
the same. Developing a successful information economy 
requires significant investment in the labour force as well as 
in the institutions that support learning and innovation. 
Informational capitalism rests firmly upon social 
institutions, even if those who benefit most from the 
informational economy fail to recognise the significance of 
those institutions. However, the chimera of the market 
remains stubbornly in place. Belief in the market is crucial 
to the new elites in defending their moral claim upon the 
rewards of the informational economy, but that ideology 
ultimately threatens the foundation of the economy itself. 
The development of informational capitalism is not 
necessarily linked to rising social inequality. However, a 
better political and economic choice would be to create an 
egalitarian information society - by developing both strong 
social institutions of innovation to support business 
activities and strong welfare states and egalitarian 
economic structures to support the population. The com- 
petitiveness agenda of restricting public spending, 
restraining wages and liberalising markets will eventually 
undermine competitiveness. Whereas Ireland's competitive- 
ness has fallen, Finland has made gains. Investing in 
education and welfare, directing resources towards the 
excluded and exploited, taking away the low wagellow skill 
- options within the economy and democratising workplace 
institutions will not destroy competitiveness, but will 
enhance it - even as inequality is tackled. 
Institutions developed in the Celtic Tiger years contain 
the seeds of an information society based on social 
innovation and egalitarianism. It is only when these 
institutions of innovation and social partnership are 
supported by sustained and universalist public investment 
that the promise of the information society can be realised. 
If Ireland is to build on the transformations of the Celtic 
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of the Celtic 
Tiger era, and not miss the opportunities it offers a second 
time around, it will have to break findamentally with the 
neo-liberal policies and ideologies which have come to shape 
the Celtic Tiger's self-definition, but which ultimately 
threaten it. 
